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In the hypothetical scenario of secession from the Eurozone, this dissertation explores 
the legal implications of the new national monetary regime for investors in Euro-
denominated debt securities. 
Different withdrawal scenarios are considered in light of the European Union legal 
framework. Rome I and Brussels I Regulations are looked at from the perspective of the 
conflict of law solutions they offer regarding the effectiveness of choice of law and 
jurisdiction agreements when confronted with mandatory redenomination rules imposed 
by an exiting State. Furthermore, monetary law principles are presented as key tools for 
an assessment of the legal protection conferred to investors in Euro-denominated bonds, 
as regards their expectations to be paid in Euros, rather than in the new national 
currency. 
This dissertation also includes a brief review of the monetary legal principle of 







1. Is withdrawal from the Eurozone possible under the EU Treaties? 6	  
1.1 Withdrawal under the EU Treaties 7	  
1.2 Withdrawal negotiated at a political level 10	  
1.3 Non-consensual withdrawal 12	  
2. The law applicable to contractual obligations in the context of cross-border debt 
securities transactions 13	  
2.1 The conflict of laws and the freedom of choice 13	  
2.2 The Rome I Regulation 15	  
2.3 Limitations to choice 19	  
2.3.1 Lex fori and public policy 19	  
2.3.2 Mandatory rules 22	  
2.4 Portuguese law 27	  
3. Jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments following the Brussels I 
Regulation 31	  
3.1 Jurisdiction agreements in the context of international debt securities transactions 31	  
3.2 Recognition and enforcement – the public policy exception 37	  
 2 
4. Foreign currency obligations and the conflict of laws 40	  
4.1 The principle of nominalism 42	  
4.1.1 The fundamentals of the legal principle of nominalism 42	  
4.1.2 An economic perspective of nominalism 43	  
4.2 The lex monetae, the Euro and the redenomination of cross-border debt securities 47	  
4.3 The impact of exchange controls on payments under debt securities 49	  
4.3.1 International private law principles 49	  
4.3.2 Rome I and Brussels I 50	  
4.3.3 The International Monetary Fund Agreement 52	  
Conclusion 55	  






Even before the launch of the Eurozone on 1 January 1999 there was speculation around 
the possibility of its break-up 1. 
Despite vehement refusal to acknowledge a potential failure of the single currency 
project by the high representatives of the European institutions and authorities2, at least 
since the first bailout of Greece in 2010, the future of the Euro seems to be on the 
razor's edge. More recently, negotiations of a rescue package for Cyprus have once 
again put the Euro crisis in the spotlight. 
In 2007, EICHENGREEN considered “unlikely that one or more members of the euro 
area will leave in the next ten years and that total disintegration of the euro is more 
unlikely”. Through the economic turmoil experienced internationally since September 
2008, and the ongoing sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, the arguments presented 
by the cited author for predicting a Eurozone break-through seem to remain valid. 
Actually, a Euro country considering the possibility of withdrawal from the EMU 
should not neglect “the technical difficulties of reintroducing a national currency” nor 
the economic indicators that despite the potential short-term economic advantages to be 
expected, there are likely “longer-term economic costs, and political costs of an even 
more serious nature”3. 
However, the financial markets in the Eurozone appear to be fragmented in the 
aftermath of the financial crises spurred by the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, in 
September 2008, and there are recurrent concerns about the continuity of the less 
competitive countries in the common currency area. 
                                                
1 See LASCELLES (1996); and SCOTT (1998). 
2 As highlighted by Mario Draghi in a recent speech: “[…] in the first half of last year [2012] 
fragmentation in the euro area had become so serious that some investors were questioning the future of 
our currency [and therefore] we acted to remove the unfounded fears about the future of the euro area that 
were undermining the stability of our currency”. See Speech by Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, at 
the Katholische Akademie in Bayern (Feb, 2013) 
(http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2013/html/sp130227_2.en.html). 
3 © EICHENGREEN (2007) pp 1-2. 
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Thus, it seems appropriate, even if a sensitive matter, to analyse the hypothetical 
scenario of one country – say, Portugal – pulling out of the Eurozone. Being that the 
case, Portugal’s monetary sovereignty would be restored, leading to the reintroduction 
of a national currency, with the option of its devaluation to the Euro, thereby enhancing 
the Portuguese competitiveness internationally. As a consequence, the Portuguese debt 
would be redenominated in the new currency at the initial conversion rate fixed by the 
Government. Furthermore, this process will likely coincide with monetary protective 
measures, including exchange and capital controls. 
The redenomination of debt will extend to sovereign debt, as well as to Euro-
denominated bonds and other debt securities issued by Portuguese corporate issuers. 
Investors in these bonds will be looking to secure outstanding interest payments and 
capital redemption in Euros as a means to avoid the expected rapid depreciation of the 
new currency against the Euro. Conversely, admitting that most of the Portuguese 
corporate issuers’ assets and revenue will have been converted into the highly 
depreciated domestic currency, issuers will find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
to fulfil their financial commitments in Euros. 
Assuming the Eurozone will not break-up as a whole, and hence that the Euro will 
continue to exist, this dissertation explores the legal implications of a putative transition 
from the EU monetary system to a domestic monetary system for investors in Euro-
denominated bonds issued by Portuguese companies. 
This discussion is particularly relevant with regards to Euro-denominated bonds which 
have been submitted to a foreign governing law and jurisdiction, namely those of 
England, in light of the actual ‘location’ of the transaction, i.e. the place of payment of 
interest and capital under the bonds, register, settlement and admission to trading of the 
securities, the relevant supervisory authority, domicile of the investors, to name only a 
few (potentially relevant) connecting factors. 
Different withdrawal scenarios are considered in light of the European Union legal 
framework. Rome I and Brussels I Regulations are looked at from the perspective of the 
conflict of law solutions they offer regarding the effectiveness of choice of law and 
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jurisdiction agreements when confronted with mandatory redenomination rules imposed 
by an exiting State. Furthermore, monetary law principles are presented as key tools for 
an assessment of the legal protection conferred to investors in Euro-denominated bonds, 
as regards their expectations to be paid in Euros, rather than in the new national 
currency. 
This dissertation also includes a brief review of the monetary legal principle of 
nominalism from an economic theory perspective. 
The topics discussed are selected and presented with the purpose of providing a legal 
background for the discussion of different problems that Portuguese issuers of Euro-
denominated bonds and the respective investors may encounter in the future, if Portugal 
withdrew from the Eurozone. 
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1. Is withdrawal from the Eurozone possible under the EU Treaties? 
The decision for Portugal to enter the Eurozone was a political decision, and, similarly, 
a decision from the Portuguese Government to drop-out of the Euro would be taken at a 
political level as well. The causes for such a decision are not relevant for this 
discussion. 
This Chapter analyses the legal framework of a hypothetical withdrawal from the 
monetary union, with the purpose of providing sufficient background for the discussion 
of the impact of mandatory redenomination imposed by an exiting country on Euro-
denominated bonds. 
If Portugal left the Eurozone, this would give rise to practical difficulties around the 
performance of monetary obligations denominated in Euros with a relevant connection 
with the Portuguese territory, and specifically as regards the payment of principle and 
interest under the Euro-denominated Bonds. The expected difficulties will require a 
legal solution. 
This Chapter explores three possible withdrawal scenarios: (i) voluntary withdrawal 
from the Economic and Monetary Union within the framework of the EU Treaties4; (ii) 
non-consensual unilateral withdrawal; and (iii) withdrawal negotiated at a political level 
and legitimated by a Treaty amendment. 
The analysis carried out below is based on the assumption that a Member State’s 
withdrawal from the Eurozone would be done at the initiative of that Member State. 
However, the contrary could also happen. The Eurozone might feel the urge to expel 
one of the Euro countries, eg “where the economy of the individual State has ceased to 
be comparable with that of the Eurozone as a whole, such that it threatens the effective 
conduct of monetary policy and the cohesion of monetary union itself”5. In the words of 
ATHANASSIOU, this scenario “would be legally next to impossible”6. 
                                                
4 Unless stated otherwise, references to articles of the Treaties shall refer to their current versions. 
5 PROCTOR (2005), p 775. See further PROCTOR (2006), pp 934-937. 
6 ATHANASSIOU (2009), p 24; see further pp 31-39. 
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Only withdrawal by one or more Member States will be explored, and not the 
possibility of collapse of the Eurozone as a whole. 
1.1 Withdrawal under the EU Treaties 
The direct answer to the question of whether or not withdrawal from the Eurozone is 
possible under the EU Treaties is no, as the Treaties do not expressly contemplate the 
right of withdrawal from the EMU by one of its member States. 
It is apparent from the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992, which laid down the foundations of 
the EMU, that the European Union aimed for the adoption of the single currency by all 
its Member States from the very beginning7. 
Since its outset, the implementation of the monetary union was seen as a one way road. 
Article 123(4) of the EC Treaty stressed the irrevocability of the transition from the 
former national currencies to the Euro. Furthermore, the irreversibility of the adoption 
of the single currency was declared by the Protocol (No 24) on the transition to the third 
stage of economic and monetary union (1992) annexed to the EC Treaty8. 
Withdrawal under the Treaty of Lisbon 
The signing of the Treaty of Lisbon was the first formal and express recognition of the 
scenario of a possible secession of the European Union by the Member States (Article 
50 of the TEU)9. 
The Member States sought to establish a voluntary right of withdrawal in identical 
terms in 2004 when they signed the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (the 
                                                
7 See the first indent of Art B of the Treaty of Maastricht, which refers to the “establishment of economic 
and monetary union, ultimately including a single currency” as a main objective of the EU. See further 
Arts 3a(2) and 109j-l of the 1992 EC Treaty (92/C 224/01). For an analysis of the Treaty of Maastricht, 
see PITTA e CUNHA (1999), pp 34-45. 
8 Art 123(4) and the Protocol were repealed by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
9 Art 50(1) states as follows: “Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance 
with its own constitutional requirements”. 
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“Constitution”)10. Given that ratification of the Constitution was unsuccessful, 
negotiations followed for the adoption of an amending treaty instead, which was agreed 
and signed in Lisbon in December 2007. 
Pursuant to the mentioned exit clause, the decision of the Member State is unilateral and 
unconditional, its effectiveness not being dependent on the consent from the other 
Member States or the verification of any requirements of EU law11. Member States are 
the “masters of the treaties” and their constitutional provisions constitute the only 
limitation to the exercise of the withdrawal right.12. 
However, does Article 50 allow a separate withdrawal from the EMU? The answer is 
probably not. Article 50 grants a discretionary power to the Member States to choose to 
be in or out of the EU as a whole, the so-called ‘all-or-nothing approach’13. If a Member 
State decides to withdraw from the EU, it will necessarily drop-out of the EMU as well, 
since the latter is a mere subset of, and subject to, the former. The possibility to leave 
the EMU whilst remaining in the EU, in contrast, is neither expressly nor implicitly 
contemplated. 
The a fortiori argument 
On the face of the silence of the EU Treaty exit clause, under the general principle of 
law a maiore ad minus, or the a fortiori argument, the provision that allows the greater, 
i.e. the voluntary exit of a Member State from the EU, should also permit the smaller, 
i.e. that a Member State wishing to remain in the EU could simply drop out of the 
EMU. 
                                                
10 Constitution Art I-60. See, eg, GALVÃO TELES (2005), p 890. 
11 It is possible, although perhaps unlikely, that withdrawal becomes effective 2 years following due 
notification by the exiting Member State regardless of an agreement being achieved with the EU (TEU 
Art 50(3)). 
12 On the topic of State primacy, see FRIEL (2004), pp 422-428. For a succinct presentation on the 
Member States’ approach over the years to the potential evolution of the EU from an economic to a 
federal union, see, eg PITTA e CUNHA (2011), pp 965-975. 
13 HOFMEISTER (2011), p 132. 
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However, a broad construction of Article 50, allowing a country to exit the EMU while 
remaining in the EU, does not seem to be correct in the light of an historical, 
teleological and systematic interpretation of this provision. 
As mentioned, the establishment of the EMU is one of the main objectives of the EU14. 
This does not set out to be a mere programmatic guideline, rather they are mandatory 
and legally binding on the EU and on each Member State15. 
The Treaties envisage the participation of all Member States in the EMU, with the 
exception of the UK and Denmark which have negotiated opt-out rights since the 
conception of the Eurozone. The other Member States that have not adopted the single 
currency yet, the so-called Member States with a derogation, are required under the 
Treaties to make progress towards the fulfilment of the necessary criteria for the 
accession to the third and final stage of the EMU, i.e. the transition from their national 
currencies to the Euro16. 
Furthermore, the Treaties give clear instructions to the competent EU institutions and 
authorities, including the ECB, to ascertain, on a regular basis, and make a decision on 
whether Member States with a derogation have achieved a state of compliance with the 
standards required for the adoption of the single currency17. If the conclusion is that they 
have satisfied the conditions necessary to join the Eurozone, the Council shall abrogate 
the derogation. This results in the concerned Member State automatically acceding to 
the EMU18. The opt-out States are subject to different rules and will only adopt the 
single currency on a voluntary basis. 
Under the EU Treaties, the ‘derogation’ status is precarious as all of its holders are 
required to evolve to a complete monetary integration. Therefore, despite the right to 
voluntarily enter or exit the EU, from the moment a Member State chooses to be in the 
EU it will have to comply with the Treaties including complying with the obligation to 
                                                
14 TEU Art 3(4) and TFEU Art 119. 
15 HOFMEISTER (2011), p 129. 
16 TFEU Art 40(1). 
17 TFEU Art 140(1). 
18 TFEU Art 140(2). 
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participate in, or make its way to joining, the Eurozone. Failing to do this would place a 
Member State in breach of its Treaty obligations. 
The risk of cherry-picking 
The possibility of withdrawal from the EMU whilst remaining in the EU could result in 
different stages of integration for each Member State as it would open the gate for the 
so-called ‘pick and choose’ approach to Treaty obligations, which is in clear 
contradiction with the ‘integrity’ and ‘sustainability’ of the EU19. Selective withdrawal 
from different subsets of the EU by the Members States would also set off (lack of) 
transparency issues. 
The evident counterargument is that it is against the goal of integration to let a Member 
State go against its will if the only reason for secession is the need to regain the control 
of monetary policy20. 
In conclusion, under the current framework of the Treaties, it looks as if the only way 
out for a country wishing to exit the Eurozone is to withdraw from the EU altogether, 
making use of the exit option granted by Article 50. 
1.2 Withdrawal negotiated at a political level 
Pulling out of the EMU would have implications not only for the exiting State, but also 
for the remaining Member States, including the opt-out States. 
A Member State intending to pull out of the EMU may try to negotiate the withdrawal 
process with the other Member States at an institutional level. 
While negotiating the withdrawal agreement, the exiting State would be aiming for 
recognition of an identical status under the Treaties as that conferred to the opt-out 
States, i.e. a sort of a ‘retrospective opt-out’21. 
                                                
19 ATHANASSIOU (2009), p 39-40. 
20 HOFMEISTER (2011), p 131. 
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The introduction of the necessary amendments to permit independent secession from the 
EMU will implicate a renegotiation of the Treaties, and the consent of all Member 
States. Again, this stems from the fundamental premise that the Member States are and 
shall remain ‘the masters of the treaties’22. 
Such an amendment to the Treaties could follow the simplified revision procedure laid 
down by Article 48(6) of the EU Treaty. Accordingly, the exiting State would need to 
submit a proposal to the European Council, thereby requesting the revision of the Treaty 
provisions respecting the EMU23. The proposal shall be adopted upon unanimous 
decision by the European Council, after consulting the Parliament, the Commission, and 
the ECB. Any changes to the Treaties would only enter into force after approval by all 
Member States. 
The withdrawal agreement would need to set the terms of the new status of the exiting 
State within the EU. 
Note that the remaining Member States are not required under the Treaties to consent to 
a withdrawal from the EMU. Depending on the financial implications of such departure, 
negotiations of a price for the withdrawal agreement are likely to be commenced24. And 
as someone has observed, the critical point of the negotiations will probably be the 
agreement on the initial redenomination rates25. 
Reaching an agreement within the EU might not be an easy task considering the 
entrenched concept of irreversibility of the EMU project. This was highlighted by the 
former President of the ECB, Jean-Claude Trichet: “One cannot jump in and jump out 
of the euro area as one hops on and off from a bus. Participation in EMU commits the 
destiny of a country”26. 
                                                                                                                                          
21 Idem, p 130. 
22 PROCTOR (2005), p 774. 
23 TFEU Title VIII of the Part 3. 
24 PROCTOR (2005), p 775. 
25 GEORGIEV (2010). 
26 Interview with Jean-Claude Trichet, former President of the ECB, 9 April 2010 
(http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2010/html/sp100409_1.en.html). 
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1.3 Non-consensual withdrawal 
Given that voluntary withdrawal from the Eurozone is not possible within the Treaties 
framework, and assuming a putative scenario where a consensus is not reached 
regarding the amendment of the Treaties, hypothetically, a country under financial and 
economical distress may be compelled to make the drastic decision of pulling out of the 
EMU in breach of its Treaty obligations. 
As a result, it would recuperate sovereign power over its monetary system. After the 
introduction of a new national currency, the exiting State would be able to devaluate it 
as a means to enhance international competitiveness of its economy. In doing so it 
should expect to achieve a reduction of the country’s current account deficit27.  
However, the implications of a non-consensual withdrawal are very hard to anticipate. 
                                                
27 Please note that other factors may concur to such devaluation, including the lack of confidence of other 
countries and of the creditors regarding the new currency. 
 13 
2. The law applicable to contractual obligations in the context of cross-border debt 
securities transactions 
2.1 The conflict of laws and the freedom of choice 
The conflict of laws, also referred to as international private law, is the branch of a 
national legal framework that deals with those situations that have a foreign element. A 
foreign element can be any point of contact with a different jurisdiction, either in terms 
of the parties’ residence, the location of the object of the transaction or the place of 
performance of obligations28. 
The object of the conflict of laws is not domestic transactions, as there is no role for it to 
play without the confluence of at least two different jurisdictions. When applied to 
contract law, the conflict rules determine which national law shall govern the rights and 
obligations arising from international contracts, i.e. containing a foreign element. 
The law applicable to contractual obligations in the context of cross-border transactions 
benefits from the long established and broadly accepted freedom of choice principle, 
recognised by modern legal systems29, unlike proprietary rights, which are yet to gather 
consensus at international and European levels and have triggered competing conflict of 
law theories30. 
Two simple explanations may be at the origin of the early acceptance of the freedom of 
choice principle applied to contractual obligations. On the one hand, it has proven to be 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to establish one objective criterion that fits all 
contracts in general or even specific criteria for different categories of contracts. On the 
other hand, the ability of the parties to pick out the law which better suits them and to 
                                                
28 DICEY (2006), Vol 1, p 3. 
29 LIMA PINHEIRO (2009), Vol 2, p 266; and FERRER CORREIA, in RBDC (1990), p 4. 
30 See BRIGGS, "Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law" (2008), p 400. 
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rely on that law to govern their legal affairs is a corollary of the party autonomy 
principle, a fundamental cornerstone of contract law31. 
Today it is generally accepted that the parties have the right to choose any law they 
deem most suitable to govern their contractual relationships despite the lack of objective 
connection between the chosen law and the facts of the contract. Moreover, the parties 
can agree on a foreign law to govern a contract of purely domestic nature. This has not 
always been the case though. In the not too distant past the legislature, judiciary and 
doctrine in civil law countries required the presence of a foreign element as a condition 
to the prerogative of the parties to choose a foreign law to govern their contracts32. 
Common law, however, has never imposed such a constraint to the exercise of 
autonomy by the parties33. 
In England, and in other common law countries, it eventually became common ground 
that the parties' choice shall not be overridden unless the parties did not enter into the 
agreement for bona fide reasons, the choice of law is illegal or on the grounds of public 
policy issues34. 
At EU level, the freedom of choice was consolidated as a principle of law following the 
implementation of the Rome Convention. It is now enforceable as a matter of EU law in 
accordance with the Rome I Regulation and applicable to contracts entered into force as 
from 17 December 2009. 
Consensus has developed around the idea that legal certainty and predictability are the 
foundations and the ultimate mission of conflict of law principles, rules and techniques 
(the conflict of laws ‘toolkit’ as BRIGGS puts it35)36. 
                                                
31 See FERRER CORREIA, in RLJ (1990), p 291; and BRIGGS, "The Conflict of Laws" (2008), p 155. 
32 See FERRER CORREIA, in RLJ (1990), p 363; and DICEY (2006), Vol 2, pp 1560-1561. 
33 BRIGGS, "Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law" (2008), p 381. 
34 DICEY (2006), Vol 2, pp 1560-1561. 
35 BRIGGS, "The Conflict of Laws" (2008), Preface. 
36 See LIMA PINHEIRO (2009), Vol 2, p 266. 
 15 
Confirming that idea, DICEY states that "the main justification for the conflict of laws 
is that it implements the reasonable and legitimate expectations of the parties to a 
transaction or an occurrence"37. 
2.2 The Rome I Regulation 
EU Member States felt the need to replace the Rome Convention with the Rome I 
Regulation38 in order to promote the internal market by improving "predictability of the 
outcome of litigation, certainty as to the law applicable and the free movement of 
judgments, for the conflict of law rules in the Member States to designate the same 
national law irrespective of the country of the court in which an action is brought"39. 
The material scope of Rome I is laid down by Article 1(1), its applicability being 
limited to those "situations involving a conflict of laws, to contractual obligations in 
civil and commercial matters"40. 
Rome I is in force both in Portugal and in the United Kingdom. 
The UK was not convinced by the preliminary versions of the document. On that basis, 
it made use of its opt-out right, thus the reference in the final text of Rome I that "the 
United Kingdom is not taking part in the adoption of this Regulation and is not bound 
by it or subject to its application"41. 
                                                
37 DICEY (2006), Vol 1, p 4. 
38 Unless stated otherwise, mentions in this Chapter 2.2 to specific articles or recitals should be read as 
references to Rome I. 
39 Recital 6. 
40 Regarding the interpretation of ‘contractual obligations’ in the context of Rome I, it is useful to bear in 
mind that "the European Court has confirmed that the concept of 'matters relating to a contract' is to be 
regarded as an independent concept, and is not to be tested simply by reference to national law. [...] 
contractual obligation [is] by its nature one which is voluntarily assumed by agreement". DICEY (2006), 
Vol 2, p 1547. 
41 Recital 45. 
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In fact, the final text of Rome I did not introduce changes to the fundamental principles 
and structure of the Rome Convention, the Government having concluded that the UK 
should therefore opt in42. 
Freedom of choice applied to contractual aspects of securities 
It is very uncommon that the parties to cross-border securities transactions do not 
expressly establish the respective governing law. Making use of the Latin expression, 
the parties choose the lex causae of their legal relationships. Thus, no account will be 
taken of the fall-back provisions of Rome I regarding the law applicable to contractual 
obligations, this discussion being exclusively focused on the freedom of choice 
principle and its limitations. 
Under Rome I, the parties may choose the law applicable to their contractual rights and 
obligations, which shall be expressed in the contract or at least capable of being 
demonstrated43. The parties may pick out one law to rule their rights and obligations or 
as many as they wish to govern different parts of the contract. Further, there are no 
limitations in terms of the array of laws the parties are allowed to pick from: the parties 
may choose the law of whichever jurisdiction they like, whether or not such jurisdiction 
links back in any way to the contract, without any need to justify their choice. The only 
general limitation is that the choice should be made for bona fide reasons, whichever 
they may be, and not have a fraudulent purpose44. 
Pursuant to Article 6(4)(d), the consensual terms and conditions of financial 
instruments, including bonds and other debt securities45, are subject to the freedom of 
choice primary conflict under Rome I46. This ensures that the rights and obligations 
                                                
42 A formal decision of the EU Commission (2009/26/EC, 22 Dec 2008) was subsequently issued 
extending the entering into force of Rome I to the UK. 
43 Art 3, Recital 11. 
44 See LIMA PINHEIRO (2009), Vol 2, p 267; and FERRER CORREIA (2007), pp 421 sqq. 
45 Art 4 of the MiFID ex vi Recital 30. 
46 This stems from the need to avoid the applicability of different laws to each of the securities issued, 
depending on the residence of their respective holders, thereby securing uniformity of legal regime and 
fungibility of each series. See Recitals 26 and 28. The Rome Convention did not establish this exception 
(see Art 5). However, the definition of consumer contracts under the Rome Convention had a specific 
mention to supply of ‘goods’ and ‘services’. Securities were not considered ‘goods’, and therefore the 
rules on consumer contracts were not applicable to them. See the Giuliano-Lagarde Report in this respect. 
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arising from an issue of debt securities, namely all aspects of the relationship 
established between the issuer and the investor47, shall be governed by the law chosen 
by the parties at the time of issuance48. 
It has been argued that the exception introduced by Article 6(4)(d) was unnecessary 
because of Article 1(2)(d)49. This is not correct though as Articles 6(4)(d) and 1(2)(d) 
refer to two different realities: the former relates to an exception to the application of 
the stricter rules concerning consumer contracts, whereas the latter sets out an exclusion 
to the material scope of Rome I. 
Furthermore, Article 1(2)(d) has a limited reach – it excludes from the scope of Rome I 
the obligations relating to, and arising out of, the negotiable character of the 
instruments, and not the negotiable instruments altogether50. It is worth noting the 
Giuliano-Lagarde Report on the Rome Convention affirmation that “neither the 
contracts pursuant to which such instruments are issued nor contracts for the purchase 
and sale of such instruments are excluded”. This is also true for Rome I. 
It is apparent from the text and structure of Rome I that negotiable instruments, 
including, among others, bonds and other debt securities, are within its scope of 
applicability, their terms and conditions being subject to the freedom of choice principle 
as a result of the exception laid down by Article 6(4)(d). Thus, falling within the scope 
of Rome I are those “legal questions concerning the nature, validity and content of the 
underlying rights represented by the instrument (eg the right to payment of principle and 
interest under the bond), and the obligations of the issuing party, as enforceable against 
that party by the original holder”51. 
                                                                                                                                          
On the differences between the Rome Convention and Rome I as regards financial instruments, see, “The 
Law of Cross-Border Securities Transactions” (1999), p 82; and ALFEREZ (2009), pp 85-91. 
47 Recital 26. 
48 Without prejudice to the right to subsequently agree on a different law (Art 3(2)). 
49 See ALFEREZ (2009), p 91. 
50 This exclusion is limited to “questions concerning the transfer of those rights to another person (the 
‘holder’) by the ‘negotiation’ of the instrument so as to entitle the holder to enforce the original 
obligations to the issuing party”. DICEY (2012), Vol 2, p 2099. 
51 DICEY (2012), Vol 2, p 2099. 
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As regards the currency in which the securities are denominated we should be able to 
affirm with a comforting degree of certainty that the freedom of choice principle 
endorsed by Rome I shall apply to its full extent52. 
The fundamental question is, however, whether the freedom of choice rule established 
by Rome I will suffice when it comes to securing the investors in Euro-denominated 
bonds with a connection with Portugal, eg, the issuer, from a mandatory redenomination 
of debt decreed by the Portuguese Government in case of secession from the Eurozone, 
even in those cases where the English law is expressed to govern the bonds53. This topic 
will be explored in Chapter 2.3. 
Scope of the law applicable under Rome I 
Article 12(1)(c) states that "within the limits of the powers conferred on the court by its 
procedural law, the consequences of a total or partial breach of obligations, including 
the assessment of damages in so far as it is governed by rules of law". This rule leaves it 
to the governing law of the contract to determine the consequences of a breach of 
obligations. This adds to the safeguard of the effectiveness of the governing law clause, 
especially where it is combined with a choice of jurisdiction clause. Article 12(1)(d) 
also supports the predominance of a foreign governing law concerning "the various 
ways of extinguishing obligations". 
Article 12(2), however, favours the application of the laws of the country where 
performance takes place “in relation to the manner of performance and the steps to be 
taken in the event of defective performance”54. 
This provision might be relevant for an issue of bonds under which payments of interest 
and capital reimbursement are set to be made to accounts domiciled in Portugal. Thus, 
under Article 12(2), notwithstanding the lex causae being the English law, account shall 
                                                
52 Except in those cases covered by Art 3(3), eg, as a result of monetary protective measures. 
53 For an analysis of the concept of foreign bonds (‘obrigações estrangeiras’), see PIRES (2001), pp 34-
38. 
54 According to NUSSBAUM, the currency in which payment obligations under financial instruments 
shall be discharged are “merely a question of ‘manner of payment’”. NUSSBAUM (1950), pp 360 sqq. 
See further LIMA PINHEIRO (2009), Vol 2, p 324. 
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be taken of the Portuguese law as regards the manner of performance of payment 
obligations under the bonds. 
2.3 Limitations to choice 
The starting point of this discussion is the freedom of choice principle. This is the rule, 
in principle, and in most cases the judge will indeed give effect to the choice of the 
parties, as they are instructed to under the conflict of laws. 
There are exceptions to this principle though which can significantly hamper the 
effectiveness of the lex causae defined by the parties. This Chapter 2.3 explores these 
limitations. 
2.3.1 Lex fori and public policy 
Lex fori 
Courts may be directed by their domestic laws, i.e. the lex fori, to decide against the 
parties’ express will, i.e. disrespecting the lex causae. 
Let us focus on limitations introduced by the national law of the courts where a dispute 
resolution hearing related to the contract takes place. 
It should be made clear that the law of the forum does not have the power to hinder the 
parties from making a free choice of governing law. Freedom of choice is a given. The 
lex fori limitation is a consequence of a ‘dialogue’ established between the legislature 
and the judiciary of the country with jurisdiction over any disputes relating to the 
contract55. 
Acting as the recipient of this dialogue, the judge will take account of the parties’ 
choice, as per applicable conflict of law rules, but only to the extent it is allowed to do 
so by domestic law. Consequently, the result of a choice of law clause might not always 
                                                
55 See BRIGGS, "Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law", (2008), p 538. 
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live up to the parties’ expectations either because the judge is not allowed to give effect 
to a particular rule of the law they picked or because the court is directed to apply a 
provision of the law of the forum which the parties would rather have avoided56. 
The limitations imposed by the lex fori and the parties’ contractual choice, however, 
should not be regarded as incompatible or contradictory. Quoting BRIGGS to sum up 
this idea, the laws of the forum as they may be mandatorily applicable to the case are 
“located outside the universe of rules which are subject to the parties' contractual 
autonomy and its exercise, and choice of law has no relevance to them”57. 
Some certainty may be shed on this limitation through the choice of the competent 
forum. In so far as the parties are aware of the site of the lawsuit, should there be one in 
the future, then they will be in a position to predict the mandatory provisions of the 
forum that the judge may be directed to apply. 
In some cases, the judge might be instructed to apply foreign provisions of law which 
are neither comprised in the governing law nor in the law of the forum58. This seems to 
be in contradiction with the idea upon choice of the forum the parties can assess the 
mandatory rules potentially applicable by the judge. This seems to open the gate to 
countless potential applicable laws, giving the parties the heavy onus, or even 
impossible task, of making the due diligence of all potential mandatory provision of law 
that may be applied. The burden imposed on the parties to make such an assessment, 
combined with the natural evolution of laws make it debatable to say that the parties can 
confidently choose the mandatory provisions of law by choosing the forum59. 
                                                
56 On the relative effect of agreements on choice of law as a source of rights and obligations established 
between the parties regardless of its recognition by the courts, and which may give rise to civil remedies, 
see, BRIGGS, op cit (2008), pp 526 sqq. 
57 BRIGGS, op cit (2008), pp 381-383. 
58 On overriding mandatory rules of a legal system other than that of the lex cause or the lex fori, please 
refer to Chapter 2.3.2. 
59 Chapter 3.1 deals with the subject of choice of jurisdiction. 
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Public policy 
Public policy has been described as the sum of ‘fundamental principles of justice’, 
‘prevalent conception of good morals’ and ‘deep-rooted tradition of the common 
weal’60. Through public policy we can generally understand the essence of a given legal 
system. 
It is the duty of the judge to apply the public policy limitation in cases where the lex 
causae contradicts the lex fori. The judge must disregard specific provisions of the lex 
causae to protect a fundamental principle of the public policy of the forum which would 
otherwise be damaged. According to BAPTISTA MACHADO, a judge shall not apply a 
foreign law to the extent it sets rules which are ‘essentially diverging’ from the 
equivalent provisions of the national law which are inspired by the general welfare of 
the community and are, for that reason, absolutely imperative61. 
Under Rome I, rules of the lex causae which thwart the essential public policy of the 
forum may be refused applicability by the courts62. 
The prevalence of the public policy of the lex fori has a restrictive effect on the 
autonomy of the parties, and hence its exceptional nature. Invocation of the public 
policy exception should therefore be guided by the principle of the least possible harm 
to the lex causae63. 
The starting point of the public policy assessment is whether the performance of the 
contract violates a specific rule or principle of the lex fori so fundamental that it should 
be treated by the courts as a matter of public policy. Consequently, only if the 
performance of the contract in the particular case proves to be contrary to the public 
policy of the forum shall there be legal grounds for the exclusion of the governing law64. 
A mere abstract incompatibility is not enough. From a conflict of laws perspective, it is 
                                                
60 See DICEY (2006), Vol 2, pp 1626-1633. 
61 See BAPTISTA MACHADO (1999), p 261. 
62 Art 21. See Art 22 of the Portuguese Civil Code. 
63 See LIMA PINHEIRO (2009), Vol 1, p 596, on the so-called ‘princípio do mínimo dano à lei 
estrangeira’; and LIMA PINHEIRO (2012) Vol 3, pp 417-418. 
64 See BAPTISTA MACHADO (1999), pp 261-262. 
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not acceptable that the courts exclude the application of the expressed governing law on 
the basis that the performance of the contract would be illegal under the laws of the 
forum. 
The scope of the public policy exception is dependent on the connecting elements with 
the forum. One situation may be manifestly contrary to the public policy if there is a 
close link to the country of the forum, whereas the opposite conclusion is possible in 
case of a faint connection65. 
Public policy is dynamic in the sense that it tends to change over time as a consequence 
of the evolution of general social or economic values66. Thus, the exact extension of the 
public policy of a legal system at a given point in time in the future is unpredictable. 
Furthermore, the relevant public policy which shall be taken account of by the judge is 
the one prevailing at the time of the concerned judicial proceeding67. 
The most typical principles integrating the public policy of a given legal system are 
human rights and other fundamental personality rights. However, provisions of law 
which pursue or protect economic values can also be recognised as part of the public 
policy of a State68. 
As a principle, monetary system rules, including exchange control provisions, integrate 
the essential public policy of a country. 
2.3.2 Mandatory rules 
Mandatory rules can be defined as those rules which cannot be derogated from by 
agreement of the parties. This is a general definition and encloses two types of 
mandatory rules: internal and external. The difference is that internal mandatory rules 
are binding within a certain legal system but can be excluded by the choice of a foreign 
                                                
65 See LIMA PINHEIRO (2009) Vol 1, p 594. 
66 See BELOHLÁVEK (2010), p 1488. 
67 This is what BAPTISTA MADADO calls the ‘contemporaneity’ (‘actualidade’) of the public policy. 
BAPTISTA MACHADO (1999), p 266. 
68 See LIMA PINHEIRO (2009), Vol 1, p 591; and BAPTISTA MACHADO (1999), p 261. 
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governing law, whereas the external ones, the so-called overriding mandatory rules69, or 
foreign mandatory rules, are binding despite express choice of a foreign governing 
law70. 
Purely domestic contracts 
The freedom of choice principle, as it is laid down by Article 3, is not limited in scope 
to cases effectively involving a conflict of laws. On this particular point, Rome I steps 
beyond its material scope, as it is set out in Article 1, to allow the parties to choose any 
governing law whether or not "all other elements relevant to the situation at the time of 
the choice are located in [another] country"71. 
When a transaction does not have an international side to it the parties can still pick a 
foreign governing law, but only for those rights and obligations that are purely 
consensual according to domestic law. Any other aspects ruled by imperative law of the 
country where the contract is located, referred to above as internal mandatory rules, 
will not be governed by such foreign law. In these cases the parties are not really 
choosing the law applicable to their contract, but just referring to a foreign law to 
govern the rights and obligations which are purely consensual from a domestic law 
perspective72. 
This rule seems to apply to those cases where, regarding an issue of bonds, the only 
connecting factor of the issue to a foreign jurisdiction are the clauses of governing law 
and choice of jurisdiction. In those cases, the choice of English law shall not exclude the 
application of the provisions of Portuguese law that cannot be derogated from by 
agreement of the parties. Depending on their exact terms, mandatory redenomination 
                                                
69 In the opinion of LIMA PINHEIRO, the correct designation of the so-called overriding mandatory rules 
(‘normas de aplicação imediata’ or ‘normas de aplicação necessária’) is ‘self-limiting provisions 
capable of mandatory applicability’ (‘normas autolimitadas susceptíveis de aplicação necessária’). 
LIMA PINHEIRO (2009)Vol 1, pp 243-254. See further MARQUES dos SANTOS (1991), Vol 2. 
70 See FERRER CORREIA (2007), pp 406 sqq; and PAUKNEROVÁ (2010). 
71 For a critical view of Art 3(3), see LIMA PINHEIRO (2009), Vol 2, pp 268-269. 
72 Art 3(3) reads as follows: "where a choice of law is made and all other elements relevant to the 
situation are located in a country other than the country whose law has been chosen, the choice of law 
should not prejudice the application of provisions of the law of that country which cannot be derogated 
from by agreement. This rule should apply whether or not the choice of law was accompanied by a choice 
of court or tribunal". See further Recital 15. 
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and exchange control rules are likely to be enforced by the judge regardless of the 
governing law of the bonds. At this point, however, it is only possible to speculate about 
the scope of such rules and their applicability to the particular circumstances of the case 
brought before the judge. 
Overriding mandatory rules 
Overriding mandatory rules are closely related to public policy. The aim of overriding 
mandatory rules, and of the public policy exception, is to protect the fundamental public 
interests of a certain community. Nevertheless, they constitute two different legal 
instruments. The line between them has been drawn as follows: “while public policy is a 
certain general value category, an overriding mandatory provision is a binding means of 
asserting a certain public interest”73. 
Overriding mandatory rules entails an exception to the conflict of law rules – they apply 
notwithstanding the provisions of law governing the materiality of a particular case. By 
definition, overriding mandatory rules belong to a legal system other than that of the lex 
causae. They can be rules of the forum and hence normally applicable to procedural 
matters, or some other law or laws other than the lex causae or the lex fori. Thus, a 
provision of law which falls outside of the legal system where the case is based by 
determination of the conflict of laws can have a significant impact on the ruling of that 
case. 
Overriding mandatory rules shall not be blindly applied by the courts, rather account 
should be taken of the specific circumstances of the case. There is no abstract 
measurement stick for overriding mandatory rules. 
Given their exceptional character, limitations introduced by overriding mandatory rules 
can only restrict full applicability of the governing law to that extent strictly necessary. 
Express choice of law shall not be voided altogether by virtue of an overriding 
mandatory rule. The governing law shall prevail in so far as it remains untouched by the 
specific scope of the relevant particular overriding mandatory provision. 
                                                
73 BELOHLÁVEK (2010), p 1488. 
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Similarly to the public policy exception, the intensity of the link that can established 
between the circumstances of the case and the foreign mandatory rule should be 
assessed by the judge for purposes of determining to which extent that rule applies and 
hence its potential to thwart the otherwise applicable law74. 
The idea of an overriding mandatory rule subverts everything that has been said so far 
about the principles of international private law. The normal mandate of the conflict of 
laws is to determine the law applicable to a particular situation in the name of legal 
certainty and predictability, and once that is settled the legal substance of the particular 
situation should be governed by that law. Despite the importance of legal certainty and 
predictability, they fade out where there is a potential interference from other laws. 
It is important to consider what is the explanation for this exception to freedom of 
choice. In the words of DICEY, "one of the main reasons for the overriding character of 
such legislation is that otherwise the intention of the legislature to regulate certain 
contractual matters could be frustrated if it were open to the parties to choose some 
foreign law to govern their contract"75. 
Rome I rules regarding overriding mandatory provisions of law highlight how these 
exceptional rules constitute a significant limitation to party autonomy, overriding the 
effective applicability of the governing law chosen by the parties in the name of ‘public 
interest’76. 
Article 9(1) starts off by laying down the following definition: "Overriding mandatory 
provisions are provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for 
safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation, to 
such an extent that they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, 
irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract under this Regulation". As 
further explained in Recital 37, overriding mandatory rules should not, however, be 
                                                
74 See BELOHLÁVEK (2010), p 1490. 
75 DICEY (2006), Vol 1, pp 24-29. 
76 Recital 37. 
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taken for a synonym of "'provisions which cannot be derogated from by agreement' and 
should be construed more restrictively”77. 
According to Article 9(2), Rome I sets out no restrictions to the application of 
overriding mandatory rules of the lex fori. In the words of BRIGGS, this rule "take[s] 
the form of mandatory laws directed at local judges, rather than direct constraints upon 
the freedom of the parties to exercise autonomy in choice of law"78. 
The exceptional rule laid down by Article 9(3) invests the courts of the forum with 
specific powers to give effect to overriding mandatory provisions of the law other than 
those of the forum, i.e. “of the country where the obligations arising out of the contract 
have to be or have been performed, in so far as those overriding mandatory provisions 
render the performance of the contract unlawful"79. Foreign provisions of law, however, 
cannot be completely foreign to the contract in the sense that there must be a link 
between the contract and the foreign legal system. The mandatory provisions that apply 
in such cases will be the overriding mandatory provisions of the country where the 
contract is bound to be performed, the so-called lex loci solutionis80. 
As a consequence of the provisions established by Articles 9(2) and 9(3), the parties 
should carefully review the mandatory provisions and public policy order of the chosen 
lex fori, and also conduct the same assessment in respect to the place where the contract 
is to be performed. 
If the overriding mandatory provisions of the lex fori and of the lex loci solutionis are 
predictable at the time of the establishment of the contract, the parties agreeing on a 
specific jurisdiction should, or at least have the possibility to, be fully aware of them. 
However, the enactment of new overriding mandatory provisions of law imprints great 
                                                
77 For a conceptual analysis of the difference between rules which cannot be derogated from by agreement 
of the parties (the so-called internal public order) and overriding mandatory rules (which integrate the so-
called international public order), see, eg LIMA PINHEIRO (2009), Vol 1, p 588; and BAPTISTA 
MACHADO (1999), pp 253-257. 
78 BRIGGS, op cit (2008), p 425. 
79 Art 9(3) starts off by stating that “effect may be given…”, suggesting that application of foreign 
mandatory rules is under the discretion of the judge and ‘merely facultative’. BELOHLÁVEK (2010), p 
1507; 
80 For a critical view of Art 9(3), see LIMA PINHEIRO (2009), Vol 2, p 326. 
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uncertainty about the future validity and enforceability of the contract81. However, it can 
be the case that such a variation in law has implicit a damage to the public policy order 
of the forum. This situation is likely to create a confrontation between the overriding 
mandatory provisions and public policy order. 
Finance laws, including mandatory redenomination, respective conversion rates and 
monetary protective measures, such as exchange control rules and capital controls, are 
examples of overriding mandatory rules82. Consequently, when faced with monetary 
policy rules established by a foreign law, the judge will not have the power to ignore 
them if they were created “with the genuine object of protecting the State's economy”, 
but only in those cases where the exchange control rules were laid down as “an 
instrument of oppression and discrimination”83. 
A turning point in the resolution of the redenomination issues could be the entering 
into a consensual protocol among the EU Member States, including the exiting 
State, under which all States commit to endorse any monetary restrictions as may be 
introduced by any State dropping out of the monetary union. 
2.4 Portuguese law 
Given that the Rome I Regulation constitutes the main source of conflict rules on 
contractual obligations in the Portuguese legal order, this Chapter on domestic rules 
concerning the law applicable to contractual aspects of securities will have a limited 
scope84. 
Article 40(1) of the Portuguese Securities Code ensures the freedom of choice principle 
applies generally to the terms and conditions of bonds and other debt securities, without 
                                                
81 On the dynamic character (‘variabilidade’) of overriding mandatory rules, see PISSARRA (2004), p 
37. 
82 See, eg PROCTOR (2005), pp 416 sqq and 776 sqq; and BELOHLÁVEK (2010), pp 1464 sqq. 
83 DICEY (2006), Vol 2, p 1626-1633. 
84 On the hierarchical primacy of Rome I over domestic law, see TFEU Art 288 and Art 8(4) of the 
Constitution of the Portuguese Republic. Art 165(1)(o) of the Constitution needs to be interpreted in light 
of the hierarchy of laws. 
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prejudice to a few exceptions85. This rule stems from a similar provision contained in the 
Portuguese Civil Code (dating back to 1966)86. Pursuant to the universal principle of law 
that lex specialis derrogat legi generali, the general provision of the Civil Code and its 
restrictions are derogated from by the special set of rules applicable to securities. As 
mentioned, these internal provisions will only apply to those situations excluded from 
the scope of Rome I87. For this discussion, the Portuguese domestic order will be 
relevant if Portugal withdrew from the Euro area. 
The parties involved in the issuance of bonds or other debt securities are statutorily 
required to expressly state the governing law on the register of the debt issue in order to 
give effect to the choice of law clause. 
Without prejudice to the parties’ freedom of choice, Article 3 includes a protective 
provision regarding overriding mandatory rules. Article 3 itself should be deemed as an 
overriding mandatory rule in the sense of Article 9(3) of Rome I88. 
Article 3 refers exclusively to any mandatory provisions of law ("normas de aplicação 
imediata") contained in the Portuguese Securities Code which shall prevail regardless of 
any other governing law. There is one condition, however, and this is that the situation, 
activity or act under consideration has a relevant connection with the Portuguese 
territory. 
Confronted with increasingly globalised capital markets, the Portuguese legislator 
showed an eagerness to modernise the conflict of law regime applicable to securities 
transactions at the time of the adoption of the Portuguese Securities Code of 1999. On 
the face of such a phenomenon and the correlated rise in number of cross-border 
securities transactions with multiple connections with different jurisdictions, the conflict 
rules of 1999 intended to clearly delineate the scope of applicability of the Portuguese 
                                                
85 Unless stated otherwise, mentions in this Chapter 2.4 to specific articles or recitals should be read as 
references to the Portuguese Securities Code. 
86 The freedom of choice of law applicable to contractual obligations was first established in Portugal in 
1888 by Art 4(1) of the Portuguese Commercial Code. 
87 For a comprehensive analysis of the conflict of law rules contained in the Portuguese Securities Code, 
please see, eg BRITO (2000), pp 50-73; LIMA PINHEIRO (Oct, 2009), pp 661-712; and LIMA 
PINHEIRO (2009), Vol 2, pp 334-356. 
88 See LIMA PINHEIRO (2009), Vol 2, p 325. 
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securities law. Ultimately, the legislature’s goal was to find a balance that would neither 
neglect the role of the Portuguese law nor overextend its applicability89. 
In the opinion of LIMA PINHEIRO the drafting of Article 3 is unfortunate and 
undesirable. The provision is not clear as to the limits or reach of the Portuguese 
securities law and it should have taken a step forward towards an enhanced legal 
certainty. The author argues that the legislature should have listed, or at least identified, 
categories of mandatory provisions of law90. 
The concept of "relevant connection with the Portuguese territory" is the key to 
understand the boundaries of the Portuguese jurisdiction in the applicability of its 
overriding mandatory rules to cross-border situations which are relevant from a 
securities law perspective. 
As regards the issuer, does it qualify as a relevant connection with the Portuguese 
territory the fact that its legal or operational headquarters is situated in Portugal, or its 
main place of business, or its personal law is the Portuguese law? Looking at the 
wording of Article 3(1) and (2), the answer seems to be negative. Article 3(2) refers to 
"situations, activities and actions" that have a relevant connection with the Portuguese 
territory and Article(2) contains a non-comprehensive list of examples of situations that 
would be considered as upholding a relevant connection with the Portuguese territory. 
The focus is on the object of the transaction and the production or direction of its effects 
to the national territory, and not on its agents. The correct interpretation of this statute 
seems to be that the mere circumstance of the issuer of a securities transaction being a 
Portuguese entity should not constitute a relevant link for purposes of Article 3 and 
hence where no other connecting point with the national territory can be identified, it 
does not fulfil the provision’s requirement91.  
A different view of the provision would have the perverse effect of extending the 
applicability of the Portuguese Securities Code beyond the law maker’s intention. If the 
mandatory provisions of law of the Portuguese Securities Code were to be applied to 
                                                
89 Recital 6 of the Preamble of Decree-Law 486/99, of 13 Nov 1999. 
90 See LIMA PINHEIRO (Oct, 2009), pp 661-712. 
91 See DIAS (2001), pp 105-116. 
 30 
every Portuguese issuer, they would be left with no freedom of choice of applicable law 
for the issuance of bonds and other debt securities. Moreover, such an interpretation of 
Article 3 would be incompatible with Rome I freedom of choice primary rule and hence 
cannot proceed.  
 31 
3. Jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments following the Brussels I 
Regulation 
With the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, for the first time the Member States gave a 
specific mandate to the EU for the adoption of measures on the subjects of recognition 
and enforcement of decisions and of the harmonisation of conflict of law rules at 
European level. This mandate was limited to measures necessary for the development of 
the internal market. 
 
Ten years later, the Treaty of Lisbon established the grounds of the legislative 
competence of the EU institutions in the field of judicial cooperation between Member 
States in civil matters with a cross-border element. Under the TFEU, this competence is 
no longer limited in scope to those measures strictly necessary for the functioning of the 
internal market and the mutual recognition of judgments is established as the main 
aspect of judicial cooperation92. 
3.1 Jurisdiction agreements in the context of international debt securities transactions 
The ability of the parties to define the court, or courts, which shall have jurisdiction 
over any disputes that may occur during the course of a certain legal relationship 
assumes an important role in the context of cross-border securities transactions. 
As explained in Chapter 2.3.1, the laws of the forum can significantly limit the extent to 
which the law chosen by the parties to govern their rights and obligations will actually 
be applied by the judges in case of litigation. 
Through the choice of the courts before which any disputes shall be brought, the parties 
are indirectly making an option as to the mandatory provisions of law and public policy 
principles of the forum that may impose restrictions to the full applicability of the lex 
causae. 
                                                
92 TFEU Art 81. 
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The prerogative to pick the forum is, therefore, a means to achieve a higher level of 
legal certainty and predictability in the context of international trade, and of cross-
border bonds issues93. 
However, the effectiveness of exclusive jurisdiction agreements is currently weak, as 
explained in this Chapter 3.1. 
Jurisdiction agreements under Brussels I 
At present, the rules on jurisdiction agreements applicable in Portugal and in the UK are 
laid down by the Brussels I Regulation94. Although repealed by Regulation 1215/2012 
(the “Recast Regulation”), Brussels I continues to apply to any judicial proceedings 
started before 10 January 2015, the date on which the Recast Regulation will start to be 
applied by the courts of the Member States bound by this regulation95. 
Brussels I recognises, and purports to give effect to, party autonomy in the field of 
jurisdiction96. Accordingly, the parties are free to choose the court, or courts, of a 
Member State which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any disputes arising from a 
particular legal relationship, in so far as one of them is domiciled in a Member State97. 
As described by BRIGGS, “the general scheme is that an agreement on jurisdiction is 
binding and must be given effect by the court chosen (prorogation) and by all other 
courts which would have had, but by reason of the agreement do not have, jurisdiction 
(derogation)”98. 
                                                
93 According to the Summary of the Impact Assessment accompanying the Commission Proposal for a 
recast of Brussels I (COM(2010) 748), “the overwhelming majority of EU business involved in cross-
border trade makes use of choice of court agreements (almost 70% of all companies and 90% of large 
companies)”. 
94 Unless stated otherwise, mentions in this Chapter 3 to specific articles or recitals should be read as 
references to Brussels I. Regarding the scope of application of Brussels I, see TEIXEIRA de SOUSA 
(2002), pp 675-691. 
95 All Member States, except for Denmark. 
96 See Art 23 (which is actually identical to its predecessor in the Brussels Convention), and Recital 14. 
97 The domicile requirement is dropped by the Recast Regulation. 
98 BRIGGS, op cit (2008), p 237. 
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There are exceptions to the choice of jurisdiction though. First, an agreement which is 
contrary to mandatory rules on jurisdiction agreements for insurance, consumer and 
employment contracts, or derogates the jurisdiction of a court with exclusive 
jurisdiction by virtue of Article 2299 shall produce no legal effects100. 
Regarding this exception it is worth noting that Brussels I does not contain a similar 
provision to that of Rome I by which financial instruments are expressly excluded from 
the scope of applicability of consumer contract stricter rules on jurisdiction 
agreements101. Neither does the Recast Regulation102. Consequently, the correct 
interpretation of Brussels I seems to be that jurisdiction agreements regarding 
contractual rights and obligations established between the issuer and the investors shall 
be subject to the rules laid down for consumer contracts (Article 17), which aim for the 
protection of the consumers, and not to the general rule on jurisdiction agreements 
(Article 23)103. 
A choice of jurisdiction agreement in these cases would be rendered ineffective as 
regards the issuer’s right to bring action against the investors in the English courts. Any 
judicial proceedings at the initiative of the issuer would have to be started in the courts 
of the defendant’s domicile104. 
However, the jurisdiction agreement will be binding in the part which allows investors 
to bring action before the courts of England105. This prerogative granted to investors is 
not contrary to the restrictions laid down for consumer contracts and, to that extent, the 
jurisdiction agreement shall be effective. 
The second exception to the free choice of jurisdiction is the defendant’s consent after 
action is brought before a court other than that prorogated by agreement. In this case, 
                                                
99 Recast Art 24. 
100 Art 23(5), Recast Art 25(4). 
101 Art 15 sqq. 
102 Recast 17 sqq. 
103 See ALFEREZ (2009), p 89. 
104 Art 16(2) (Recast Art 18(2)) combined with Art 23(5) (Recast Art 25(4)). 
105 Art 17(2), Recast Art 19(2). 
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the jurisdiction agreement shall be disregarded if the defendant appears before the court 
seised and does not contest its jurisdiction106. 
Third, there is a limitation to the jurisdiction agreement implicit in the lis pendens rules, 
which will be separately addressed below. 
Subject to these exceptions, as already mentioned, the jurisdiction agreement is binding 
and must be given effect by the prorogated, as well as by the derogated, courts. In that 
respect, no discretionary power is conferred upon the judges to respectively accept or 
decline a prorogation or derogation of jurisdiction. 
Lis pendens rules as an obstacle to the choice of jurisdiction 
Since Brussels I first came into effect in 2002, its rules on lis pendens107 stand as a grave 
obstacle to the effectiveness of exclusive jurisdiction agreements. 
The rationale behind a lis pendens rule is the prevention of parallel proceeding between 
the same parties and regarding the same cause and, more importantly, the risk of 
conflicting decisions by different judges before whom action might be brought. By 
avoiding the repetition of judicial proceedings, the lis pendens rules underpin the 
economy and efficiency of judicial procedure and hence the protection of the 
defendant108. 
In practice, however, the lis pendens regime under Brussels I has the perverse effect of 
giving room to an abusive use of the rules. The problem is that the court first seised 
shall have priority to accept or decline jurisdiction in relation to any other court, 
including the one prorogated by agreement. On that basis, a party with a tactical interest 
in bringing action before a different court than the one initially defined in the contract or 
with the intention of delaying the due course of the proceedings can achieve such 
purposes by acting quickly before the court that best suits that party’s interests. 
                                                
106 Art 24, Recast Art 26. 
107 Art 27. 
108 Recital 15, Recast Recital 21. Lis pendens is defined under Art 497(1) of the Portuguese Civil 
Procedure Code as a repetition of a case which is already being heard before a different judge. 
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The defendant can contest the jurisdiction of the court seised but it is for the judge 
before whom the action was started to ascertain the validity of the jurisdiction 
agreement109 and to accept or decline its own jurisdiction over the dispute110. 
If the court first seised accepts jurisdiction over the dispute, this will render the 
exclusive jurisdiction agreement ineffective. 
Given the capability of the lis pendens rules to neutralise the theoretical legal force 
conferred upon exclusive jurisdiction agreements, it is clear that Brussels I failed its 
objective to provide legal support to party autonomy in the field of jurisdiction. 
The European Court of Justice decision on the Erich Gasser case111 has consolidated the 
interpretation of the overriding effect of lis pendens over exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements. This is an acceptable interpretation in light of the text of Brussels I, but it is 
not imperative from this interpretation that one should conclude this was the intention of 
the legislator. 
For investors in the bond markets, the danger of this interpretation of the lis pendens 
rules is that proceedings may theoretically be initiated in the Portuguese courts, 
irrespective of a choice of jurisdiction of the English courts. If this happens, in light of 
what was said regarding mandatory rules in Chapter 2.3.2, the Portuguese courts will 
predictably apply the new monetary law enacted by the Portuguese Government 
regardless of the bonds being governed by English law. 
The Portuguese court’s decision will necessarily depend on the exact terms of the new 
monetary regime and the extent to which laws on redenomination should apply to 
                                                
109 On the topics of the definition of ‘agreement’ and its ‘validity’ under Art 23, see, eg BRIGGS, op cit 
(2008), pp 237-298; STEINLE (2010), pp 565-587; LIMA PINHEIRO (2012), Vol 3, pp 196-209; and 
FERNANDES (2008), pp 1174-1175. The Recast Regulation introduces an express conflict of law 
provision (Art 25(1) and (5)), which will likely put an end to discussions in literature around this topic. 
Under the new regime, the validity of jurisdictional agreements shall be assessed in accordance with the 
lex fori and independently from any considerations around the validity of the contract to which it applies. 
110 Jurisdiction agreements are not capable of being enforced, at least in so far as it is taken as given that 
the courts of a Member State shall not have the right to interfere with the jurisdiction of the courts another 
Member Sate. See BRIGGS, op cit. 
111 See C-116/02 Erich Gasser GmbH v Misat srl [2003] ECR I-14693. 
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specific obligations. In respect of the scope of such laws one can only speculate at this 
stage. 
Assuming that redenomination is set to be mandatory for obligations impending on 
Portuguese debtors where payment is to be made in Portugal, it is probably safe to 
assume that a Portuguese judge would declare that the issuer shall be discharged of its 
obligations by payment of interest and principle under the bonds in the new domestic 
currency. 
Reform of Brussels I 
Following a legislative proposal from the Commission for a recast of Brussels I (the 
“Commission Proposal”)112, on 12 December 2012, the European Parliament and the 
Council adopted the Recast Regulation, which will apply from 10 January 2015. 
The deficiencies of Brussels I regarding the (in)effectiveness of exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements are now addressed by the Recast Regulation. It is the legislator’s express 
will that party autonomy should be strengthened through legal mechanisms which aim 
at enhancing the effectiveness of choice of court agreements. 
Once the Recast Regulation is in effect, unconditional priority shall be granted to the 
court, or courts, chosen by the parties to assess its, or their, jurisdiction over the dispute. 
The courts of any Member State other than that chosen by the parties shall stay any 
proceedings until the court, or courts, designated in the agreement declare or decline 
jurisdiction under the agreement113. 
Having adopted, in this respect, the principles laid down by the Commission Proposal, 
the Recast Regulation stands as an acknowledgment of the improved solutions 
established in the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements114 regarding the 
priority that should be conferred upon the courts chosen by the parties. This might be 
                                                
112 COM(2010) 748. 
113 Recast Art 31(2) and (3) and Recital 22. 
114 Concluded on 30 June 2005. 
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the push that the EU needs to make a final decision on the ratification of this 
convention. 
Definitely solved the problem of the ineffectiveness of jurisdiction agreements under 
Brussels I, bond investors can be assured that English courts will have exclusive 
jurisdiction over disputes arising in connection with the bonds. 
However, whether or not the English courts will declare that the issuer’s obligation to 
make payments of interest and principle under the bonds should be settled in Euros or in 
the new national currency is a different matter, which will be explored in Chapter 4.2. 
3.2 Recognition and enforcement – the public policy exception 
Brussels I establishes two different realities in terms of mutual judiciary cooperation 
between the Member States: the recognition of judgments and the enforcement of 
judgements. 
A court of a Member State shall automatically recognise a decision taken by the courts 
of a different Member State. This means that recognition is not dependent on any 
previous checks or confirmation procedures115. 
On the other hand, enforcement is subject to an ‘efficient’ and ‘rapid’ previous 
procedure for the issue of a declaration of enforceability (exequatur) by the judge before 
which enforcement is sought116. 
Recognition or enforcement of a judgment given by the courts of a Member State may 
only be refused in limited exceptional cases by the judge before whom recognition or 
                                                
115 Art 33 and Recital 16, Recast Art 36 and Recital 26. This provision diverges from the Portuguese 
domestic law regarding recognition, which requires revision and confirmation of the foreign judgment 
(‘revisão e confirmação de sentença estrangeira’). Arts 1094 sqq of the Portuguese Civil Procedure 
Code. See MOURA VICENTE (2002), p 371. 
116 Art 38 sqq and Recital 17. The Recast Regulation has abolished the exequatur accompanied by the 
establishment of certain safeguards. Recast Recital 26. With a critical view of this new regime, LIMA 
PINHEIRO (2012), Vol 3, p 437. 
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enforcement is sought117. Under no circumstances shall the substance of the judgment be 
reviewed in the context of its recognition or enforcement by the courts of another 
Member State118. 
Refusal of recognition or enforcement on the grounds of the judgment being manifestly 
contrary to the public policy in the Member State of the court addressed is particularly 
relevant for this discussion119. 
As explained in Chapter 2.3.1, the monetary regime of a State is commonly accepted as 
part of its fundamental public policy. In principle, the adoption of a new domestic 
currency followed by legal mandatory instructions for the conversion of debt into that 
new currency, as well as any protective measures, such as exchange control regulations, 
shall be deemed as essential for the functioning of the country’s monetary regime and 
ultimately for the safeguard of its economy. Consequently, legislation of this kind will 
typically be considered within the scope of public policy. 
On these grounds, recognition and/or enforcement in Portugal of a judgement by the 
English courts declaring that payments under bonds issued by a Portuguese company 
shall be made in Euros may be refused on the basis of the public policy exception laid 
down by Brussels I. 
Attention should be paid to the fact that the court addressed is not allowed to raise of its 
own motion the argument of public policy for the refusal of recognition and/or 
enforcement of a judgment of another Member State. This procedure would have to be 
initiated by the persons against whom recognition and/or enforcement is sought, who 
would need to submit an application for refusal120. 
                                                
117 Arts 34, 35 and 45(1), Recast Arts 45 and 46. As LIMA PINHEIRO puts it, Brussels I establishes a 
legal presumption in favour (‘presunção legal favorável’) of mutual recognition and enforcement of 
judgments within the EU. See LIMA PINHEIRO (2012), Vol 3, p 409. 
118 Arts 36 and 45(2), Recast Art 52. 
119 Art 34(1), Recast Art 45(1)(a). The adverb ‘manifestly’ stresses the exceptional nature of public 
policy. Please note that it is the recognition and/or the enforcement that need to constitute a serious 
menace to public policy, and not the judgment itself. Consequently, whether or not recognition and/or 
enforcement shall be refused will be ascertained taking account of the public policy at the time 
recognition and/or enforcement are being sought. See LIMA PINHEIRO (2012), Vol 3, p 417 and pp 
419-420. 
120 Arts 39 sqq (Recast Arts 45(4) and 47 sqq) and Recital 17. Given that the most likely scenario after a 
putative withdrawal from the Eurozone is a drastic depreciation of the new national currency in relation to 
 39 
One final note on the potential scenario of Portugal exiting the EU altogether, and not 
only the Eurozone. In this case, the Brussels Regulation will no longer apply in 
Portugal121 and hence the subject of recognition of foreign judgments (confirmação de 
sentença estrangeira) would have to be dealt with in the context of domestic law. 
Considering, however, that the Portuguese Civil Procedure Code also excludes 
recognition of a foreign judgment which is manifestly incompatible with the Portuguese 
public policy (princípios da ordem pública internacional), the practical result for any 
interested party would probably be the same122. 
                                                                                                                                          
the Euro (predictably around 50%), issuers will have the right incentive to make such an application. See, 
eg LEÃO (2012), p 217. 
121 See TEU Art 50(3). 
122 See Art 1096(f), which provides that the Portuguese Courts shall not recognise a foreign judgment 
(confirmação de sentença estrangeira) which is manifestly incompatible with the Portuguese public 
policy (princípios da ordem pública internacional). 
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4. Foreign currency obligations and the conflict of laws 
As noted by MANN, “wherever foreign currency comes into play, three legal systems 
may have to be considered: the law of the obligation or the proper law or the lex causae; 
the law of the currency, i.e. the law of the country whose currency is stipulated to be 
payable; and the lex fori”123. 
This Chapter intends to formulate the main principles of international private law 
regarding foreign currency monetary obligations124. In this respect, the rule proposed by 
DICEY reads as follows: “A debt expressed in the currency of any country involves an 
obligation to pay the nominal amount of the debt in whatever is legal tender at the time 
of payment according to the law of the country in whose currency the debt is expressed 
(lex monetae), irrespective of any fluctuations which may have occurred in the value of 
that currency […] between the time when the debt was incurred and the time of 
payment”125. 
This rule purports to explain two core principles of the legal regime of monetary 
obligations in those particular situations where there a conflict of laws element can be 
found. First, the well-established principle of nominalism and secondly the relevance of 
the law of the country in which currency the monetary obligations are bound to be 
performed as opposed to the law governing the contract from which such monetary 
obligations arise. 
As regards the lex monetae of obligations expressed in Euros, with the adoption of the 
Euro, the Eurozone countries transferred their monetary sovereignty to the EU126. The 
Euro is a project of the EU. It was created and is ruled by EU law. Thus, the lex 
monetae of the Euro is the EU law. 
                                                
123 MANN (2003), p 185. 
124 For a definition of money and for a general introduction to money obligations, see MANN (2003), pp 8 
sqq; and pp 65 sqq. 
125 DICEY (2006), Vol 2, p 1975. 
126 TFEU Art 3(1)(c) states as follows: “The Union shall have exclusive competence [regarding the] 
monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro”. See, eg PITTA e CUNHA (1999), pp 
54-58. On relative loss of sovereignty, PROCTOR  (2012), pp 807-834. 
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The hypothetical secession of Portugal from the MEU creates a difficult problem for the 
legal theory. This scenario would certainly involve the creation of a new currency, and 
in all likelihood the mandatory redenomination of Portuguese debt. If we exclude the 
possibility of a Eurozone collapse and hence assume the continuation of the Euro as a 
currency in circulation in the European and international markets, this will give rise to a 
new problem. 
It is not the symmetrical situation of the transition from national currencies to the Euro. 
In 1998/1999, redenomination of debt was determined by EU law and by decree of each 
of the Eurozone States. At the time, the States held control over their monetary systems, 
and the lex monetae of the old national currencies was the respective national law. The 
old currencies were gradually removed from circulation, while the Euro, the single 
currency, was introduced and eventually replaced them as the legal tender in the 
Eurozone. If not before, on 1 January 2002, all debt in the Eurozone was automatically 
redenominated in Euro, at the conversion rate fixed for each old currency127. 
Now that the return to national currency is being considered, the scenario is different. 
Unlike the transition to the Euro, the currency in which outstanding monetary 
obligations are denominated, i.e. the Euro, will not disappear. Furthermore, the lex 
monetae of such obligations is deemed to be the EU law, and perfectly detached from 
the multiple national laws of each of the Eurozone countries. 
The traditional principles of nominalism and predominance of the lex monetae will have 
to be adapted to this new reality. 
The aim of this Chapter is to provide the legal principles in which legal answers might 
reside. 
                                                
127 See PROCTOR (2005), pp 776 sqq. 
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4.1 The principle of nominalism 
4.1.1 The fundamentals of the legal principle of nominalism 
The principle of nominalism is generally accepted in countries that have developed 
modern legal systems and its fundamentals are simple. At the time they become due, 
monetary obligations shall be fulfilled by payment of their nominal value as expressed 
by the parties at the time the terms of the agreement where established or renegotiated, 
irrespective of any fluctuations in the value of the currency in which the obligations are 
denominated that may have occurred in the meantime128. 
In other words, “a mere change in the value of [money] however serious it may be, is 
irrelevant to the monetary rights and obligations of the parties”129. 
It should be noted that it follows from the principle of nominalism that monetary 
obligations are indestructible. In the words of MANN, this statement means that 
“neither circumstances peculiar to the debtor, such as his poverty, nor circumstance 
arising from developments in the monetary system, such as the emergence of a new 
currency or the elimination OF protective clauses or the introduction of exchange 
control, ever relieve the debtor of his duty to pay [his debts]”130. 
If a monetary system becomes extinct, still there will be no grounds to invoke the 
termination of a debt on the grounds of impossibility, as there will be no gap between 
the old and the new monetary system that shall succeed. This also stems from the 
principle of the continuity of contracts131 The new monetary system shall establish the 
rules in accordance to which outstanding monetary obligations shall be discharged. 
Thus, the obligation shall be redenominated and the amount payable shall be calculated 
                                                
128 See NUSSBAUM (1950), pp 349 sqq. 
129 PROCTOR (2005), pp 331 sqq. 
130 MANN (2003), pp 65 sqq. 
131 See WAHLIG (2000), p 122. 
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in accordance with the conversion rate which shall be fixed having as a reference the 
previous currency, the so-called recurrent link132. 
The most obvious disadvantage of the principle of nominalism is that the creditor will 
necessarily bear the risk of currency devaluation, which in particular geographies at 
certain periods of history can result in dramatic losses in real value. Of course the 
reverse of this is that the debtor shall bear the risk of currency appreciation, a much less 
common event though. Unfortunately, the alternatives are even less appealing and thus 
have been consistently precluded over time. In fact, as DICEY puts it, the principle of 
nominalism is “an indispensable foundation of modern economic life”133. 
Of course the parties may try to protect themselves from the undesirable effects of the 
principle of nominalism, i.e. the uncertainty of the value of money over time. For that 
purpose, to the extent admissible under the governing law of the monetary obligations 
assumed, the parties may agree on protective clauses, such as gold clauses, commodity 
clauses, index clauses or multiple currency clauses134. 
4.1.2 An economic perspective of nominalism 
The principle of nominalism provides a limited, however useful and appropriate, legal 
answer to a basic contractual problem, which arises from the fluctuation of the value of 
money over time. 
In short, the nominalistic principle states that an obligation to pay €10 shall be 
discharged by the payment to the creditor of that same amount of money at the time the 
obligation becomes due, regardless of any variations in the real value of €10, from when 
the debt was contracted up until the moment of its settlement. 
                                                
132 For an extensive analysis of the indestructibleness of money debts and for an overview of the so-called 
Knapp’s ‘recurrent link’ theory, see NUSSBAUM (1950), pp 131 sqq. In this respect, it seems 
worthwhile to quote NUSSBAUM (p 353): “Where a new currency is created a recasting rule for debts 
incurred in the old currency will […] ordinarily be provided by legislation. […] the state which has 
created a given currency must also have power from the international point of view to replace it by 
another, just as it may alter it: and this conclusion extends to the recasting rule, a necessary incident in the 
transition to the new currency, provided it is a bona fide rule not purporting to harm foreign creditors”. 
133 DICEY (2006), Vol 2, pp 1978-1980 
134 See DICEY (2006), Vol 2, pp 1995-1997. 
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Variations in the real value of a currency affect the cost of goods, services, assets and its 
cash flows. The change in value of a currency can be illustrated by selecting a particular 
basket of goods that €10 can buy today and then calculating how much the same basket 
costs in 2, 10 or 50 years time. Assuming no fundamental changes to the demand and 
supply sides of the market, if the basket gets cheaper it is a result of deflation, whereas 
inflation would be associated with an increase in the (nominal) price of the goods. 
Deflation is less frequent than inflation. Thus, the following reasoning and comments 
will refer to inflation only, without prejudice to drawing symmetric conclusions for 
deflation. 
From an investor’s perspective what is relevant is the real return of the investment. In 
the case of a bond, it will be represented by the sum of the proceedings from the 
coupons135 plus the capital reimbursement, each payment adjusted according to the 
inflation verified since the inception of the obligation. 
The value of money has a direct impact on the real value an investor will obtain from its 
investments. As changes to the rate of inflation are not predictable with accuracy, there 
is no certainty of the value of the currency in which the security is denominated and 
hence of the real value of the investment return. The investor necessarily faces this 
uncertainty when evaluating a prospective investment. 
For an investor in the bond market, fluctuations in the value of money will have an 
impact on the real value of both interest payments and the capital reimbursed at 
maturity.  
From the perspective of the economic theory, however, and to take account of inflation, 
the discussion might be entirely subsumed in the interest rate component and the key 
point is the distinction between the real interest rate and the nominal interest rate of the 
bond.136 
                                                
135 Zero coupon bonds, as their name implies, pay no interest. These bonds are placed with investors 
below their par value, the return resulting from the difference between price and nominal value. 
136 Note that, even in the secondary market, the value of the bond is factored in the implicit yield to 
maturity. 
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A fundamental reference in this matter is the renowned Fisher’s theory of interest137, 
cited prominently, for example, by MARK BLAUG138. Fisher’s theory of interest was of 
the utmost relevance in the history of the economic theory, and the formula through 
which the real interest rate is still defined in the modern advanced economic theory is 
known as ‘Fisher identity’139: 
 eir π−≡  
where r stands for the real interest rate, i for the nominal interest rate, and eπ for the 
expected inflation. 
As investors are confronted with the nominal interest rate at the time of making the 
investment decisions, for that purpose, the Fisher equation should be rewritten as 
follows: 
 eri π+= 140 
The Fisher identity shows how an investor in bonds, in addition to the default risk 
factored in the nominal interest rate, i, takes account of the future inflation, eπ . 
The investor makes a “rational guess” on the expected inflation, eπ , thus facing the risk 
of the variation between the expected inflation at the time of the investment decision 
and the real or effective inflation rate verified for each interest period. 
The inflation enters in the equation as an expected value – arising from the uncertainty 
inherent to the future outcomes of economic variables and decisions. The investor’s real 
rate of return stands as a pure economic problem It is not for the law to solve this 
problem, so that the investor can be reassured of the real return of its investment. 
                                                
137 FISHER, “The Theory of Interest”, first published in 1930 by The Macmillan Co. 
138 BLAUG (1985). 
139 See, eg ROMER (1996), p 392. 
140 For a brief summary on yield to maturity computation, see, eg DAMODARAN, (2002), p 888; and 
ROSS (2006), pp 198 sqq. 
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Moreover, to ‘measure’ inflation is a complex task, which reinforces the arguments in 
favour of keeping money fluctuations outside the scope of the legal theory of money. 
“Economists and analysts have expended considerable time and resources forecasting 
inflation, with mixed results”141. There are not only one, but multiple economic 
measures of inflation with different methods leading to different conclusions. Actually, 
there is always a margin of fluctuation in the calculation of indices. As a result, in 
organised markets, it is the best investor’s criterion that prevails in estimating inflation. 
The consequence of this being that the investor is not confronted with uncertainty at a 
legal level, but with the normal uncertainty of economic activity and investment choice. 
In the case of floating rate notes, where the coupon is indexed to a money market 
reference rate (eg, Euribor and Libor, among others), the expected inflation is assumed 
in the reference rate. Nonetheless, legal certainty remains unfettered. The reason for this 
is that the monetary correction factor, for example in the case of floating rate notes, is 
subsumed, even if imperfectly, in the contractual reference rate, for example the 
Euribor142. For these bonds, although the nominal obligation is not determined ab initio, 
it is determinable at the time of performance. In any case, this does not constitute 
derogation from the principle of nominalism, but an alternative contractual solution 
attempting to converge the effective return and the expected return, thereby mitigating 
the inflation risk. 
From the rational investor’s standpoint, the required interest rate (IRR, or yield to 
maturity in the particular context of bonds) for their investments will be determined as 
the sum of the following factors: risk-free interest rate (the opportunity cost), a spread 
which reflects the implicit risk of default and the expected inflation rate. In this regard, 
considering the increasing economic uncertainty inherent to extended investment 
horizons, including any variations in the risk-free interest rate, as a principle, investors 
will require higher yields for longer maturities. 
In this context, the role of monetary law in general, and of the principle of nominalism 
in particular, is to determine what is determinable ex ante, i.e. that the issuer will be 
                                                
141 DAMODARAN, op cit, p 895. 
142 The Euribor is the benchmark rate at which Eurozone banks lend money to each other. It is calculated 
and published daily by the respective screen service provider. As such, although the applicable Euribor 
cannot be determined at inception, it is determinable at settlement. 
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discharged of its obligation by the payment of the nominal value of the bond at 
maturity. For the sake of legal certainty, “the extent of monetary obligations cannot be 
determined otherwise than by the adoption of nominalism”143. By doing so, this essential 
principle of monetary law is determining the content of a monetary obligation in so far 
as it is determinable at the time of the establishment of the obligation. Within the 
boundaries of what is possibly achievable by a formal rule of law, it purports to inject 
certainty into the financial transactions. It is not for the law to eliminate the risks of the 
economic activity, including the uncertainties concerning the evolution of prices. 
As mentioned above, there is no standard economic measure of inflation gathering 
universal consensus in the academy144. If that was the case, then the parties could agree 
the real rate of return of the investment ab initio. It is precisely because of its aim to 
preserve the legal certainty to the maximum degree that it can possibly be preserved that 
the nominalism is a long established principle in the legal theory of money, and has 
managed to keep its relevance145. 
As a final note, it goes without saying that debtors and creditors seeking to exclude the 
effects of nominalism may agree on the issue of inflation-linked bonds, i.e. bonds where 
the principle and/or the interest rate(s) are indexed to inflation. 
4.2 The lex monetae, the Euro and the redenomination of cross-border debt securities 
The principle of nominalism when applied to foreign monetary obligations calls for the 
intervention of conflict of law rules. 
Taking as a given that the nominalism is recognised as a principle by the lex causae and 
applied by the judges according to the lex fori (and that should indeed be the case in 
most countries with developed economies and modern laws), the nominalistic principle 
dictates that it shall be the law of the currency (the lex monetae) to determine what is 
‘legal tender’ for purposes of the fulfilment of the foreign monetary obligation in 
                                                
143 MANN (2003), pp 86 sqq. 
144 DAMODARAN, op cit, p 895. 
145 For a historical overview of the evolution of the principle of nominalism, see MANN (2003), pp 86 
sqq. 
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question and ultimately by which means the debtor can be discharged from its 
obligation146. 
In short, legal tender shall be the currency (or currencies) recognised by the applicable 
law, i.e. the lex monetae, and is the only one that can be offered as payment by a debtor 
and must be accepted by the creditor as valid fulfilment of a monetary obligation. 
The primary reason behind the principle of the prevalence of the lex monetae in force at 
the time a debt is due derives from the fact that, in the words of DICEY, "it is a 
fundamental principle that monetary obligations cannot become impossible to perform 
by virtue of the currency in which the obligation is expressed ceasing to exist”147. 
In support of this principle, the conflict of laws dictates that the lex monetae shall have 
mandate to establish the terms of the succession of the ceasing currency and the new 
currency that shall replace it. 
The currency in which a monetary obligation is expressed and the respective nominal 
value, which is defined with reference to the so-called units of account of the relevant 
currency, are defined by the lex monetae. This is a corollary of sovereign powers 
conferred upon the States over their own currency. 
In the particular case of the Euro, however, monetary sovereignty lies with the EU.  
No doubt that as a consequence of a pulling out of the Eurozone, Portugal would regain 
its monetary sovereignty. However, the former currency in which the monetary 
obligations were denominated, i.e. the Euro, does not disappear, and the lex monetae of 
the Euro is the EU law, as mentioned, and not the Portuguese law. Thus, the difficulties 
around the legal force and the consequences of a mandatory redenomination of debt 
ordered by Portugal if it withdrew from the EMU. 
                                                
146 In this respect, see further Art 558 of the Portuguese Civil Code. LIMA PINHEIRO (2009), Vol 2, pp 
323-324. 
147 DICEY (2006), Vol 2, p 1981. 
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4.3 The impact of exchange controls on payments under debt securities 
Exchange controls have been described as “a system of open restrictions on payments or 
transfers to or for the benefit of persons resident in another country, which is imposed to 
protect the financial resources of the country and which is thus primarily concerned 
with the outward movement of payments or transfers”148. 
4.3.1 International private law principles 
In principle, foreign exchange control legislation implemented by the country of the lex 
causae will be recognised by the courts and applied in accordance with the ordinary 
principles of the conflict of laws. As a result, the judge hearing the case will only give 
effect to any contractual monetary obligations to the extent as the governing law may 
permit its performance under any foreign exchange control rules that may apply. 
Under this principle of law, there seems to be no doubt that payments of interest and 
capital of a bond issue denominated in Euros and governed by Portuguese law shall be 
payable in the new currency if so dictated by Portuguese exchange control regulations, 
when and to which extent these may be implemented. If according to the governing law 
of the contract, Euro should no longer be legal tender for purposes of a specific 
monetary obligation, and judges, in or outside Portugal, will give effect to such 
restrictive legislation and decide according to the Portuguese exchange control 
regulations, i.e. that the debt shall be discharged in the national currency. 
In principle, the same is true for those cases where exchange control rules are put in 
place by the country where payments are set to be performed, regardless of the 
governing law of the contract from which those monetary obligations arise. 
Consequently, if payment in the currency established by the parties in the contract is or 
becomes illegal according to the legislation applicable in the country where 
performance takes place, commonly referred to as the ‘place of payment’, then the court 
will give effect to this legislation and hence determine that payment shall not be made 
in any such banned currency. 
                                                
148 PROCTOR (2005), pp 331 sqq. 
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In addition, the doctrine seems to concur that the place of payment should be the 
relevant connecting factor to foreign exchange control legislation and no other. 
Nationality, the country of residence or the place of business should not be considered 
as sufficient link to foreign exchange rules with the power to excuse performance under 
the contract. 
On the face of the above, let us consider the following example: an issue of Euro-
denominated bonds by a Portuguese issuer, which is governed by English law, was 
underwritten by mainstream international banks, the syndicate perhaps including one or 
two Portuguese banks, the bonds were deposited with Euroclear/Clearstream and 
admitted to trading in the London Stock Exchange, payments of interest and capital on 
maturity are set to be made to an account of the syndicate leader opened with an English 
bank and domiciled in London. In this example there is only one, or maybe two points 
of contact with the Portuguese jurisdiction: the issuer is Portuguese in accordance with 
Portuguese law and one or more underwriters might have their headquarters or carry out 
business in Portugal. If, in a potential scenario where Portugal drops out of the 
Eurozone, the Portuguese Government implements exchange control regulations, 
according to the conflict of law principles mentioned previously, notwithstanding the 
said connecting elements, the terms of the bond issue, including the original currency in 
which payments have to be made, shall be safeguarded from foreign exchange controls 
intrusion, and the Portuguese regulations shall not constitute defence on a dispute 
resolution on the contract or contracts relating to the Euro-denominated bonds. 
4.3.2 Rome I and Brussels I 
The Rome I Regulation provisions that are particularly relevant in the field of foreign 
exchange control regulations are contained in Article 9 concerning overriding 
mandatory rules of law and in Article 21 on the public policy exception of the forum. 
Regarding the Brussels I Regulation, the fundamental rule for purposes of this 
discussion is that relating to the public policy exception in the context of recognition 
and enforcement of judgments149. 
                                                
149 Art 34(1), Recast Art 45(1)(a). 
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Following a hypothetical withdrawal from the EMU, Portugal will likely implement 
measures which envisage the protection of the new monetary system. These will 
typically include exchange controls. Under such exchange controls, as a rule, payments 
in any currency other than the new national currency, including in Euro, will be 
restricted. 
It has been argued that genuine exchange controls “are intended for the protection of a 
country and its economy as a whole”150, especially in those cases of national distress. 
Thus, restrictive monetary policy measures, including exchange controls, should, in 
principle, qualify as overriding mandatory provisions. This understanding is in line with 
the definition of overriding mandatory rules under Article 9(1) of Rome I151. 
Furthermore, such monetary protective rules which will likely be implemented by 
Portugal following a putative withdrawal from the EMU will also integrate the 
Portuguese fundamental public policy152. 
If the Portuguese courts have jurisdiction where the lex causae is a foreign law (a very 
unlikely hypothesis), a judge in Portugal will be required to take account of such 
exchange controls on the grounds that they are subsumable under mandatory rules and 
public policy of the forum153. Similar deference would be required in the context of 
recognition and/or enforcement in Portugal of a judgement by the courts of another 
Member State in light of the public policy exception154. Accordingly, the Portuguese 
court before which action is brought should decide that payments under the bonds shall 
be discharged in the new national currency, regardless of the law governing the 
concerned monetary obligations. Similarly, recognition and/or enforcement in Portugal 
of a judicial decision by a court of another Member State determining payment in Euros 
shall be refused as manifestly contrary to the public policy of Portugal155. 
                                                
150 PROCTOR (2005), pp 416-417. See further MICHAEL MANN (1956), pp 286-301. 
151 Refer to Chapter 2.3.2 regarding the concept of overriding mandatory rules. 
152 Refer to Chapter 2.3.1 regarding the concept of public policy. 
153 In accordance with Arts 9(2) and 21 of Rome I. 
154 In accordance with Art 34(1) of Brussels I, Recast Art 45(1)(a). 
155 On a different front, please note that where enforcement of monetary obligations is being sought in 
Portugal, conversion into the new national currency is ‘usually inevitable”, “since compulsory liquidation 
of the debtor’s property at public sale will yield local currency”. NUSSBAUM (1950), pp 370 sqq. 
 52 
Notwithstanding the above, considering a different scenario where jurisdiction belongs 
to the courts of another Member State, eg the English courts, effect may still be given to 
Portuguese exchange controls in so far as the settlement of any monetary obligations is 
set to occur in Portugal. Under Article 9(3) of Rome I, which recognises the lex loci 
solutionis, the judges of another Member State shall only attend to rules so fundamental 
that would “render the performance of the contract unlawful”. This requirement, 
however, does not seem to stand as an obstacle against effectiveness of Portuguese 
exchange rules being granted by the courts of another Member State, since exchange 
control rules determine the illegality of payments in any currency other than that 
defined by the Government as legal tender. 
In the scenario proposed in the previous paragraph, there is a chance of a conflict 
between the Portuguese exchange rules which are granted an overriding mandatory 
status under Rome I, and the fundamental public policy of the courts of the Member 
State where proceedings are being heard, eg the English courts. If the Portuguese 
exchange controls are deemed as manifestly contrary to the English public policy, then 
it is arguable that the English courts may refuse the application of such exchange 
controls, namely on the grounds that they have been established or are being used “for 
the purpose of oppression or discrimination”156. This possibility, however, is very 
unlikely in practice in light of the International Monetary Fund Agreement, as explained 
in the next Chapter. 
4.3.3 The International Monetary Fund Agreement 
Article VIII(2)(b) of the IMF Agreement, also known as the Bretton Woods Agreement, 
mandates that the courts of IMF member States shall recognise exchange control rules 
imposed by other IMF members in so far as these rules are consistent with the IMF 
Agreement. Consequently, any obligations expressed in the currency of a member 
country which has implemented exchange control rules that introduce any restrictions to 
payments in the contractual currency shall not be enforced by the judges of other IMF 
countries. 
                                                
156 See DICEY (2006), Vol 2, pp 2006-2007; and PROCTOR (2005), pp 331 sqq. 
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This provision can lead to the application of the laws of a country which is connected 
with the transaction on one single aspect – the currency in which monetary obligations 
are denominated (the lex monetae). The IMF rule does not call for any additional link 
with the country implementing exchange control rules – it applies simply as a matter of 
the currency which the parties have chosen to pay their debts or other monetary 
obligations, irrespective of where they are or where the performance of the contract is 
intended to occur. This is made very clear by IMF Decision No 446-4 by expressing 
IMF views that any contracts in conflict with exchange control rules of a member State 
“will be treated as unenforceable notwithstanding that under the private international 
law of the forum, the law under which the foreign exchange control regulations are 
maintained or imposed is not the law which governs the exchange contract or its 
performance”. 
As per the said decision, IMF’s official interpretation of Article VIII(2(b) also makes 
the point that “the member country before which the proceedings are brought will not, 
on the ground that they are contrary to the public policy (ordre public) of the forum, 
refuse recognition of the exchange control regulations of the other member which are 
maintained or imposed consistently with the Fund Agreement”. 
The above is an official interpretation of an international agreement and as such it is not 
binding on the judges to whom it is addressed. Needless to say that this interpretation, 
although not legally binding, will influence the judiciary. As a result, DICEY 
speculates, it seems very unlikely that a judge in England, as or in any other member of 
the IMF, would disregard IMF instructions by not giving effect to another member’s 
exchange control rules based on arguments of offence to the public order of the forum, 
even if the exchange controls in question have been or are being “administered in a 
discriminatory or oppressive manner”157. 
The IMF Agreement is applicable in the Portuguese legal order and is capable of being 
invoked before a judge hearing a dispute arising in connection with an international 
contract158. 
                                                
157 See DICEY (2006), Vol 2, pp 2010-2013. 
158 Decree-Law 43 338, of 28 November 1960. See PIRES (2001), p 268. 
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Article VIII(2)(b) also foresees the possibility of the establishment of an agreement or 
terms of cooperation and mutual recognition of foreign exchange control measures 
implemented, or to be implemented, by either member to the extent that such initiatives 
are in compliance with the IMF Agreement. 
Finally, the IMF Agreement is particularly relevant for this discussion in the 
hypothetical scenarios of Portugal withdrawing from the EU altogether pursuant to the 
right conferred to the Member States in Article 50 of the EU Treaty, or of a non-
consensual unilateral withdrawal from the Eurozone. In such cases, the EU law will no 
longer bind Portugal. However, and assuming that Portugal does not resign as a member 
of the IMF, the IMF Agreement will still apply and the Portuguese exchange controls 
would have to be recognised by other IMF Members, including the English courts. 
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Conclusion 
In light of the considered legal framework, and assuming a hypothetical scenario of 
Eurozone secession, it seems there is a high probability that Euro-denominated bonds, 
even though governed by English law, will be redenominated in the new national 
currency. This probability is stronger when the transaction consists of a purely or 
mainly domestic issue and does not hold relevant foreign elements. A fundamental 
aspect for consideration is whether payments under the bonds are set to be made in 
Portugal, since in that case mandatory redenomination and exchange controls should be 
given effect by foreign courts. 
Nevertheless, the resolution of the problems enunciated depends on unpredictable 
variables. First, it is dependent on the exact terms according to which transition from 
the Euro to the national currency is effected, including as regards the subjective and 
objective scope of mandatory redenomination and the implementation process of 
exchange controls. Second, judges will need to ascertain the relevance of each internal 
or foreign connecting factor, which vary significantly by issuance, in light of the 
conflict of law rules and principles. And finally, the decision as to whether monetary 
obligations shall be discharged in Euros or in the new national currency will ultimately 
be subject to the judges’ interpretation of the lex monetae of the concerned Euro-
denominated bonds. 
Since the beginning of the Eurozone crisis, the capital markets entail an additional risk 
associated with the bonds issued by the Eurozone peripheral countries. This risk is 
commonly referred to as the ‘redenomination risk’ and it is affecting not only sovereign 
issues, but also securities issued by private sector companies in these countries. 
The redenomination risk also affects the yield to maturity of Euro-denominated bonds 
expressed to be governed by English law and submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts 
of England. This fact might be seen as an evidence of markets anticipating, i.e. putting 
some probability on, a mandatory redenomination of even these specific bonds in case 
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